EU Defends ICC Against US Threats as Prosecutor Faces Probe
The internal crisis at the ICC intensified dramatically when the court's chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, was placed on administrative leave on 20 April following a formal complaint lodged by a senior aide who alleged repeated sexual harassment and non‑consensual sexual relations.
The complaint triggered an emergency review by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), the same body that conducts audits and investigations for UN‑affiliated entities.
According to a leaked draft of the OIOS report, the accuser – identified only as a senior legal officer – provided a detailed chronology of encounters spanning more than a year, describing how Khan allegedly used his positional authority to coerce compliance and silence dissent.
The report also cites corroborating testimony from three additional staff members who observed inappropriate behaviour, such as Khan's repeated invitations to private meetings after hours and his alleged attempts to influence performance evaluations.
While the OIOS investigation remains confidential, its procedural framework mirrors that used in past UN scandals, such as the 2019 sexual‑exploitation case involving a senior UN peacekeeper in the Central African Republic.
In that precedent, the UN adopted a zero‑tolerance policy, leading to the dismissal of the officer and a comprehensive overhaul of internal reporting mechanisms.
The ICC's own internal oversight unit, the Office of Internal Review (OIR), has pledged full cooperation with the OIOS, and has temporarily reassigned Khan's portfolio to Deputy Prosecutor Luis Moreno, who will oversee ongoing investigations into war crimes in Ukraine, Sudan and the Sahel.
The suspension of Khan is historic: no ICC chief prosecutor has ever been removed under such circumstances.
It raises immediate questions about the court's governance structures, particularly the balance of power between the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and the Office of the Prosecutor.
The ASP, which convenes bi‑annually, is slated to vote on a motion to either reinstate Khan pending the investigation's outcome or to initiate formal removal procedures.
Member states are divided; while many European delegations have called for a swift, transparent process to preserve institutional credibility, a handful of African states have expressed concern that the focus on Khan could distract from the court's core mission of delivering justice to victims.
The timing is especially precarious because the ICC is currently preparing to issue arrest warrants for senior military commanders in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, a move that the United States has publicly supported despite its broader antagonism toward the court.
Khan's alleged misconduct, therefore, not only threatens his personal career but also risks destabilising the court's delicate diplomatic equilibrium at a moment when its decisions are under intense international scrutiny.
Historical Tensions Between the United States and the International Criminal Court
The current dispute must be understood against a backdrop of decades‑long ambivalence and outright hostility from the United States toward the ICC.
When the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, the US signed the treaty but refrained from ratifying it, citing concerns that American soldiers and officials could be subject to politically motivated prosecutions.
In 2002, Congress passed the American Service‑Members' Protection Act (ASPA), colloquially known as the "Hague Immunity Act," which authorized the use of force to free any US personnel detained by the ICC.
The law also prohibited US military assistance to ICC member states that were perceived as non‑cooperative.
Subsequent administrations have oscillated between engagement and obstruction.
The Obama administration, for instance, signed a bilateral agreement with the ICC in 2009 that allowed limited cooperation on specific cases, yet it simultaneously imposed a policy of "non‑cooperation" that barred the US from providing information to the court.
The Trump administration took a harder line, reinstating sanctions that threatened to cut off US aid to any country that recognised the ICC's jurisdiction over US nationals.
In 2020, the US withdrew from the United Nations' International Criminal Court Advisory Commission, further signalling its disengagement.
The Biden administration, while rhetorically supportive of international justice, has continued to block US participation in the court's investigations, particularly those involving alleged war crimes in Afghanistan.
This historical pattern illustrates a broader strategic calculus: the United States seeks to preserve sovereign immunity for its forces while simultaneously leveraging the ICC as a diplomatic tool against adversaries.
Comparatively, other major powers such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany have fully ratified the Rome Statute and actively contribute troops to peacekeeping missions under ICC oversight.
The divergence underscores a geopolitical fault line in which the US positions itself as a reluctant participant in the multilateral justice architecture, whereas the EU and its allies view the ICC as an essential component of a rules‑based order.
The latest US threats to condition aid on the ICC's exclusion of US personnel represent the most aggressive use of economic leverage to date, raising concerns that the precedent could be extended to other international bodies, thereby weakening the overall fabric of global governance.
What Lies Ahead: Scenarios for the ICC's Institutional Reform and US Relations
Looking forward, the ICC faces several plausible trajectories, each contingent on how the Assembly of States Parties resolves the Khan case and how the United States calibrates its diplomatic posture.
Scenario 1 – Swift Accountability and Reform:
The ASP votes to suspend Khan pending a definitive OIOS finding, appoints an interim prosecutor, and adopts a package of governance reforms, including an independent ethics commission, mandatory whistle‑blower protections, and a revised appointment procedure that requires a two‑thirds majority.
In this best‑case scenario, the EU doubles its financial contribution to signal confidence, and the United States, faced with a reinvigorated court, opts for a limited cooperation framework focused on counter‑terrorism cases, thereby averting a full‑scale funding showdown.
Scenario 2 – Prolonged Stalemate and Funding Crisis:
The ASP deadlocks on the vote, leaving Khan in a limbo status while the OIOS report remains unpublished.
Member states grow weary, and the EU threatens to withhold a portion of its €150 million contribution unless concrete reforms are enacted.
The United States seizes the opportunity to push a new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that would slash aid to any ICC‑supporting nation, potentially destabilising the court's budget and forcing it to scale back investigations in Africa and the Middle East.
Scenario 3 – US Withdrawal and Parallel Legal Mechanisms:
Washington escalates its campaign, imposing sanctions on ICC officials and refusing to recognise any ICC arrest warrants issued against US nationals.
In response, a coalition of European and African states initiates a parallel tribunal under the auspices of the United Nations, effectively creating a dual‑track system of international criminal justice.
This fragmentation could dilute the ICC's authority and set a precedent for other powers to establish regional courts, undermining the universality of the Rome Statute.
Experts from the International Law Commission stress that the most sustainable outcome lies in Scenario 1, where transparency, accountability and robust funding converge to restore confidence.
To that end, civil‑society organisations such as the International Center for Transitional Justice have called for an independent commission of inquiry, chaired by a former judge of the International Court of Justice, to review the ICC's internal culture and recommend structural changes.
The EU, for its part, is preparing a diplomatic package that pairs financial incentives with conditional benchmarks tied to the court's reform agenda.
Ultimately, the ICC's ability to weather this crisis will hinge on its willingness to confront internal misconduct head‑on, while the United States must reconcile its security concerns with the broader imperative of supporting a credible, impartial mechanism for prosecuting the gravest international crimes.